CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. M. A. HUSAIN (India)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1 - ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A. F. DUMONT
	Mr. V. E. BERASATEGUI
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	Mr. D. F. NATARIO
	Mr. L. F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R. W. CLARK
	Mr. R. E. MOORE
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
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	Mr. F. GAJDA
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	Mr. K. P. JAIN
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	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
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Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. C. MITRAN
	Mr. N. CHILIE
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
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Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 489th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. With the permission of the Committee, I shall now speak as representative of India.

3. On 12 March last the Indian delegation expressed the view (CCD/PV.457, para. 24) that since the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI) had firmly closed the door against the use, without exception, of all chemical and biological agents, our task in this Committee in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275) was to endeavour to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of nations. This we have been discussing for the past two years without reaching agreement. Now that we are shortly due to conclude our deliberations for 1970 and to report the result of our efforts to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, it seems necessary to analyse the reasons for our inability to make progress and to consider what prospects, if any, there are for agreement within the foreseeable future.

4. There has been much discussion: there have been mapping expeditions, submission of numerous working papers, informal exchanges of views and statements by experts; but the basic difference of approach, which emerged when the United Kingdom delegation submitted in 1969 a draft convention (ENDC/255) dealing only with biological weapons, continues to this day. Massive amounts of technical data, which have been presented by one side, and also the involvement of this Committee in technical details of verification problems, have not bridged the gulf dividing the two sides over this problem. As often happens when difficulties arise in national or international affairs, a committee is appointed to go into the matter. In this case also one delegation has suggested the appointment of a committee of experts to examine verification problems relating to chemical weapons; and another delegation has suggested a committee of experts to examine verification problems relating to both chemical and biological weapons with special concern for chemical weapons. The socialist side does not favour the appointment of such a committee because, in its view, no committee of experts can help to resolve matters which essentially concern military and political decisions. Further involvement in verification technicalities may be illuminating; but we should not lose sight of the wood for the trees. It would be more worth while if we tried to understand why and how the two sides differ from each other.

(The Chairman, India)

5. In the case of biological weapons the United States and the United Kingdom have made it clear that they consider that no verification of production, testing and stockpiling is possible or necessary, but that the complaints procedure associated with the United Kingdom draft convention on biological methods of warfare and designed to deter any would-be violators would reduce to an acceptable level the risk of accepting an unverified convention. The other side agrees with that view, except for some relatively minor details and differences of emphasis. A serious difficulty has, however, arisen with regard to chemical weapons. While it is agreed that 100 per cent effective verification is neither possible nor sought, from the Western point of view a sufficiently high degree of probability of detection is necessary in the case of chemical weapons; but that view is not shared by the socialist side.

6. This problem is reflected in the differences of opinion over whether there should be one convention dealing with both biological and chemical weapons, or more than one convention dealing with both types simultaneously, or one dealing with biological weapons now and another dealing with chemical weapons later. An attempt has been made by some delegations to dismiss the issue of the unity or the separation of the two types of weapons as an unnecessary preoccupation with a minor procedural matter. But the fact is -- and I shall soon elucidate -- that it is not a matter of mere procedure but one of substance, and the longer we refuse to recognize this basic issue the greater will be the delay in reaching an agreement. Many arguments have been advanced in favour of separation and just as many against separation without either side convincing the other. It may help if we try, while taking into account the arguments on either side, to get down to the underlying concerns of both sides.

7. The United States and the United Kingdom are ready for an immediate total elimination of biological weapons from arsenals without "effective monitoring and inspection provisions", which they consider essential in the case of chemical weapons, as we see in the United States statement of 21 April (CCD/PV.466, para. 57); and they urge that there should be:

> "... a binding international commitment by the negotiation of a convention along the lines of the draft submitted by the United Kingdom" (CCD/PV.458, para. 55).

For that course of action they have given three main reasons. In the first place, it is stated that biological weapons -

> "... have never been used and few nations appear to have engaged in substantial effort to develop them". (CCD/PV.449, para. 28)

(The Chairman, India)

Secondly, although -

"... biological weapons are principally a strategic threat to large areas and to large population concentrations" (ibid., para. 27),

and -

"... infectious microbes can be a million times more poisonous than modern nerve agents" (CCD/PV.458, para. 50),

their military utility is of a very limited character because the effect of their use is difficult to predict. In support of that it is stated that -

"... the aerosolized form of a disease -- the form in which a biological agent can best be 'weaponized' and disseminated -- obviously cannot be field-tested on human populations". (ibid., para. 51)

Further, it is stated that -

"... there can be no assurance that this form of warfare, if ever begun, would not spread uncontrollably to one's own population and to still other countries, as well as to the enemy". (ibid.)

In other words, biological weapons -

"... contain their own threat of retaliation. They might spread to the armies and even to the populations of the Power that used them, without any active intervention at all by the people against whom they were used ..." (CCD/PV.462, para. 15),

as the United Kingdom representative stated on 7 April. Also, as the United States representative stated on 17 March,

"... because of the unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences of biological weapons, their use could even produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations". (CCD/PV.458, para. 51)

Thirdly, although -

"... certain biological weapons could in fact be used either for a massive first-use attack or for a sabotage attack" (CCD/PV.466, para. 61),

they are of no use for purposes of deterrence or retaliation. It is clarified that -

"... because biological weapons inherently lack reliability as an effective deterrent or instrument of retaliation, even their known retention by one State should not affect another State's decision to give them up". (ibid., para. 60)

(The Chairman, India)

It is further argued that —

"... retaliation in kind would not be the best military response to a biological attack ...

"In deciding on what action to take, the attacked country would then have to consider the unpredictable nature of biological weapons and the incubation period required before they can take effect. Few, if any, military situations can be imagined in which a State would try to redress a military imbalance by retaliating with weapons whose effects would not show up for days. Furthermore, biological weapons could not destroy the military arsenal--the tanks, planes and artillery--of an enemy, and the side that had initiated biological warfare would presumably have taken steps to protect its military forces, which would suffer far fewer casualties than would the civilian populations of both sides." (CCD/PV.458, paras. 53, 54)

8. For those very important reasons it seems that the United States came to the conclusion that it was not worth while to develop further and to stockpile biological weapons, and indeed that those weapons were so devoid of military utility and so dangerous to use that the existing stockpiles should be completely destroyed. That decision was announced by the United States President on 25 November 1969.

9. The United Kingdom has stated that it has never had and does not now possess any biological weapons, nor does it intend to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile such weapons--for reasons not dissimilar to those stated by the United States. Both the United States and the United Kingdom seek that their unilateral national decisions should be followed by similar action by other States and, as I said earlier, converted into a binding international commitment.

10. The question naturally arises: if biological weapons are of such little effective military use and are so dangerous for a country itself to use that they have been unilaterally given up by important countries possessing or capable of possessing them, what is the urgency for concluding an international agreement in regard to biological weapons without waiting for an agreement on chemical weapons? To answer that question the United Kingdom delegation has stated:

(The Chairman, India)

"... if we try to negotiate an agreement including both biological and chemical weapons we shall take a very long time, and time is not on our side. If we do not eliminate germ warfare once and for all it may soon be too late". (CCD/PV.462, para. 31)

The urgency is stressed by the expression of the fear that, while at present biological weapons may not be effective and useful battlefield weapons, it cannot be said how soon there may be a breakthrough, after which it may become difficult to eliminate this weapon from arsenals at all. So the time for action is here and now. After the compelling reasons for the voluntary abandonment of this weapon, the argument about a possible breakthrough in regard to what they have undertaken unconditionally not to develop any further does not appear very convincing.

11. Therefore, while we remain unconvinced about the reasons for the urgency of eliminating what is not regarded as a reliable weapon and what they therefore seek to destroy, the reasons given by the United States and the United Kingdom for the consideration and treatment of chemical weapons separately from biological weapons and concerning the difficulties in reaching agreement on chemical weapons within the foreseeable future need to be carefully examined.

12. In the first place, it is stated that chemical weapons are tactical or battlefield weapons, that chemical weapons --

"... are more predictable and controllable than biological weapons. Unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons can produce immediate effects - an important quality for use in combat. For those reasons, chemical weapons have obvious usefulness in certain military situations. Their military utility was demonstrated in the First World War when 100,000 military personnel on both sides were killed by poison gas and 1.2 million additional casualties were reported. Today many States are capable of producing modern nerve agents which are both more toxic and more adaptable to a variety of battlefield uses than are the First World War gases." (CCD/PV.458, para. 58)

Consequently --

"... a number of countries have a chemical warfare capability or are conducting research in this field." (CCD/PV.449, para. 28)

It is added that:

"... stockpiles of vastly more lethal CW agents exist today and military doctrine openly envisages their use on an extensive scale in war." (CCD/308, para. 4)

(The Chairman, India)

13. Secondly, the reluctance to give up chemical weapons is due to the belief that --

"... a chemical warfare capability is important for their [States'] national security. States maintain chemical warfare programmes and stockpiles to deter others from using those weapons and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence were to fail. ... The inability of an attacked nation to retaliate with chemicals would give a significant military advantage to any government which might decide to violate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons." (CCD/PV.458, para. 59)

14. Since certain countries regard chemical weapons as a valuable adjunct to their military arsenals and view their retention to be essential as a deterrent and for purposes of retaliation, the United States delegation has expressed the view that --

"... they would be reluctant to give up this capability unless they were assured that all possible opponents" --

I stress the words "all possible opponents" --

"had also given it up and would not develop it again. Such assurance would be difficult to achieve even with extensive inspection." (CCD/PV.449, para. 28)

The United States delegation has defined such an assurance as "reliable and negotiable verification arrangements" (CCD/PV.458, para. 60) involving "verification by monitoring and inspection techniques" (ibid., para. 61) in which they "can have confidence that whatever bans are placed on such weapons are being observed" (ibid., para. 64).

15. On this question of verification a number of delegations have suggested procedures and administrative action for national supervision and inspection. Those suggestions include the following: the placing of all institutions engaged in chemical and bacteriological (biological) research, development and production under civil administration; unilateral renunciation of research in the production of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons; compulsory reporting to an international agency on the production, stockpiling and civilian use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents; stating in textbooks that the use of any chemical formula or bacteriological (biological) agent for warlike purposes is contrary to international law and liable to prosecution; creation of a government agency, on the pattern prescribed in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs[1], to ensure compliance with the treaty; control of the manufacture, import and export of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents and equipment which could be used for their development and production; compulsory

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 520, pp. 204 et seq.

(The Chairman, India)

registration of the requirements and quantity of production of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents; stopping of training of the army in the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and abolition of field testing of these weapons; and so on.

16. All those measures and other similar measures that can be suggested, of which some may be regarded as more and others as less efficacious, depending on the nature of the political, economic and social system of the country concerned, have the common feature that their implementation depends on the intention and goodwill of national governments. While the sponsors of the socialist countries' draft convention (A/7655) regard national supervision of that kind, along with a procedure for complaints to the Security Council, as adequate, the United States and the United Kingdom do not regard this method as good enough in the case of chemical weapons, which they consider vital for their security from the point of view both of deterrence and of retaliation. The United States delegation has therefore stated that --

> "... openness and reporting and other measures for self-policing are not sufficient in themselves to form a verification system for a prohibition on production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. ... Economic data monitoring at best could serve as an adjunct to on-site technical inspection, some measure of which clearly appears to be required for effective verification of a chemical warfare ban." (CCD/PV.468, para. 15)

To this the United Kingdom delegation has added that --

> "... the Swedish and Yugoslav proposals presuppose conditions and political attitudes which simply do not exist universally; and I have to say that to that extent they are not, in my view, as yet at any rate realistic proposals." (CCD/PV.469, para. 17)

17. A great deal of attention was devoted, therefore, to exploring the possibilities of international controls and procedures. Verification by external means such as observation satellites and remote atmospheric and effluent sensors was suggested; but the United Kingdom delegation has stated, on the basis of technical advice, that neither of those two methods could guarantee the absence of chemical weapons from any country. To that the United States delegation added, in its statement of 16 July, that research regarding verification at the various technical stages in the production cycle of chemical weapon systems has revealed that it is not possible by means of "off-site observation" either from the air or from the ground --

(The Chairman, India)

"... to determine whether a particular chemical-processing facility or complex was producing, or was capable of producing, lethal nerve agents." (CCD/PV.479, para. 8)

18. The United Kingdom draft on biological weapons provides for (a) investigation by the Secretary-General and report to the Security Council; (b) complaint to the Security Council; and (c) withdrawal from the convention in certain conditions. Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States regards those measures as adequate for chemical weapons. The draft of the socialist countries provides for (a) consultation and co-operation among parties to the convention in solving problems relating to its observance; (b) complaint to the Security Council of suspected non-observance; and (c) control to be exercised by national governments to ensure implementation of the convention -- all of which are regarded by the United Kingdom and the United States as inadequate for chemical weapons. To strengthen the complaints procedure a reference to a conference of the parties to the treaty -- as provided in the Antarctic Treaty[1/] of 1959 and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186, pp. 12-33) of 1967 -- has been suggested; but even that is not regarded by the Western side as a solution of the problem of verification of chemical weapons.

19. Therefore the United States view is that for effective verification, which it considers necessary for chemical weapons, some degree of "on-site technical inspection", the nature of which has not been defined, is essential. But the Soviet delegation is opposed to any kind of on-site inspection. It stated on 3 March that --

"... verification in the form, for instance, of control posts, the dispatch of on-site inspection groups and so on would be simply impossible from the practical point of view since, as several representatives at the General Assembly pointed out, it would be necessary to have controllers in almost every laboratory." (CCD/PV.454, para. 59)

And again, on 2 April the Soviet delegation said:

"When it comes to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons whose production is directly linked with the peaceful production of chemical substances and bacteriological products, for both these types of weapons it is impossible to establish any international verification in the form of control posts and on-site inspections." (CCD/PV.461, para. 15)

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

(The Chairman, India)

20. The problem of on-site inspections -- the insistence by one side and the rejection by the other -- is one with which we are all familiar in another context. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States delegation expressed the view on 21 April that --

> "None of us can be sure how long it will take us to formulate new prohibitions on the possession of chemical weapons, but clearly that process will be extensive and difficult. We hope that in this Committee we can all face this fact honestly ..." (CCD/PV.466, para. 64)

21. While there may be something to be said for that view, if any progress at all is to be made, no matter how slow, the United States and United Kingdom delegations, instead of stating what is not acceptable, should state specifically what is acceptable to them: the extent, the nature and the frequency of on-site inspection which they consider necessary. If they were to elaborate their views on what they mean by "on-site technical inspection" and indicate the kind of assurances they seek -- which, as I earlier quoted the United States delegation as saying, "would be difficult to achieve even with extensive inspection" (CCD/PV.449, para. 28) -- it might be possible to explore the possibility of achieving agreement on the basis of inspection by challenge or some other such method, or perhaps regretfully to accept the fact that no agreement on the matter is possible at this stage.

22. The answer to that question would indicate the extent to which it is really intended to do away with chemical weapons. The socialist countries have expressed some doubts about this. They do not accept the Western classification that biological weapons are strategic and chemical weapons are tactical, with the implication that chemical weapons are somehow less harmful. The Soviet delegation stated on 14 July that --

> "The other approach advocated by some countries -- to limit the prohibition, for the time being, to the production of bacteriological weapons and to deal with chemical weapons at some later stage -- would in fact mean excluding from the prohibition for an unspecified time and preserving for possible use a dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction: chemical warfare agents." (CCD/PV.478,para.113)

It also said that --

> "The United States proposal on toxins confirms our conviction that the difficulties the Committee is now confronting are related to political and military considerations and not to the technical difficulties which are formally invoked as the main problem." (ibid., para. 116)

(The Chairman, India)

23. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland pointed out to this Committee on 14 April that --

"My delegation finds no difficulty in agreeing with the view [of the United States delegation] that because of their nature biological weapons are very unlikely to be used.

"On the other hand, not only are we now facing the danger of chemical warfare but, as we all know, chemical methods are already being applied in an armed conflict taking place today. Therefore the obvious and logical conclusion is immediately to start negotiations which would lead to the elimination of chemical means of warfare in the first place, at the same time solving the problem of eliminating all biological means of warfare, a task which, it seems to be agreed, appears easier to achieve." (CCD/PV.464, paras. 17, 18)

24. Thus it will be seen that the priorities of both sides are the exact reverse of each other, based as they are on their different military and political doctrines. These include, among other issues, the definition of chemical weapons, the use of which is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. It is the view of the United States and the United Kingdom and some allied countries that tear gas and other incapacitating agents are not covered by the Geneva Protocol. That view is not shared by the socialist countries and most of the other countries members of this Committee. Once a decision were taken to proceed to eliminate chemical weapons and biological weapons simultaneously, it would be necessary to define chemical weapons in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2603 A (XXIV) (CCD/275), which affirmed clearly that the prohibition embodied in the Geneva Protocol was comprehensive and covered the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments.

25. It is the view of the Indian delegation that unless we address ourselves to those fundamental issues we shall make as little progress in the future as in the past towards eliminating these two weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of nations.

26. Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translation from Russian): Almost half a century has passed since this city, where we are today discussing important problems of disarmament, witnessed the conclusion of the most comprehensive and authoritative international instrument prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Members of this Committee have strongly emphasized the historic significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI) as an important restraining factor in preventing the use of these weapons of mass destruction. The Protocol played a definite role during the Second World War when the Powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition issued a stern warning to Fascist Germany concerning the inadmissibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As is known, those measures had their effect.

27. We all remember the horrible tragedy that befell Hiroshima and Nagasaki exactly twenty-five years ago as the result of the explosion of United States atomic bombs which killed or maimed approximately half a million people in Japan. Peace-loving mankind sharply condemned that atomic barbarity and launched a powerful world-wide movement for the immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their use. Thanks to those titanic efforts, some success has been achieved in averting a new thermonuclear catastrophe. Today, the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations are still tirelessly waging an active struggle.

28. However, there is now a new terrible danger threatening mankind, that of the so-called "silent weapons", as chemical and bacteriological weapons have been christened by the Western Press. In the post-war period, as has long been known, there have been intensive efforts in the leading Western countries to utilize the latest achievements of microbiology and chemistry for the purpose of creating new virus and microbic infections, the development of bacterial toxins, the discovery and accumulation of new poisonous substances of colossal toxicity which produce mass psychoses, annihilate the inhabitants of peaceful cities and villages, destroy crops and wipe out everything alive. We take it that the Committee is aware of the fact that in the secret arsenals of the Western Powers there are colossal stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological poisonous substances, these deadly weapons of mass destruction. World opinion is again witnessing the development, production, testing and utilization of chemical and bacteriological agents for military purposes. It knows of the laboratories, stockpiles, testing areas and factories of Fort Detrick, Newport, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Edgewood, Porton Down and Grafschaft.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

29. Deep concern and genuine indignation have been caused among all peace-loving peoples by the United States use of herbicides against Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of the norms of international law. Similar serious concern has been aroused by the tragic events taking place in some of the cities of Western countries where use is made of tear gas to put down peaceful demonstrations. Only people who have lost their reason can assert that biological and chemical weapons are among the "humane" methods of warfare or of dealing with disorders.

30. However, there is still another circumstance which cannot but cause us all legitimate anxiety. I am referring to the colossal stockpiles of chemical weapons held in secret arsenals whose further conservation has become extremely dangerous. As we all know, the recent transport of some "silent weapons" -- M-55 rockets filled with lethal GB gas -- for the purpose of sinking them in the Atlantic Ocean provoked the outcry -- or rather the fear and alarm -- it did in the United States itself; because such an operation could, in case of a catastrophe, cost the lives of millions of people. We have also heard expressions of alarm concerning the possible pollution of the waters of the ocean and the poisoning of its fish resources as the result of this operation. What is more, we are familiar with the facts concerning the poisoning of people and domestic animals owing to the escape of deadly gases from chemical arsenals.

31. That is the real situation today. But we should also think of the potentialities of chemical weapons as assessed in 1959 at the Fifth Pugwash Conference in Canada. The scientists assembled there found that the phospho-organic toxic substances known at the end of the Second World War were already as effective as the atomic bombs dropped on Japan.

32. My delegation has made this effort to recapitulate the foregoing well-known facts in order to emphasize once again the need for a speedy solution of important international problems, including that of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It is with that objective in mind that the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic was among the first to support the appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275). That appeal of the General Assembly to all States which had not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol during 1970 was, as we see it, a further confirmation of the need to preserve the Geneva Protocol and to ensure its universal application.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

33. In our view, prohibition alone of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare does not fully dispose of the real essence of the problem under conditions of modern scientific and technical progress. Reality sternly demands that the prohibition should be supplemented with fuller and more comprehensive prohibitory measures, including the prohibition of the further production of these weapons of mass destruction. It was that noble purpose which inspired the initiative of the nine socialist countries that submitted at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655).

34. In general, the draft of the socialist countries proposes a radical solution of this problem: it provides for an effective system of measures for the total elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The draft convention is based on the universally-accepted norm of international law whereby the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is embodied in a single international instrument — as it is in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

35. In that connexion my delegation was interested in the statement on 28 July of Mr. Khattabi, the representative of Morocco, in which he emphasized inter alia that

> " ... military reasons should not prevent us from dealing with these two categories of weapons together and enacting their prohibition in a single instrument". (CCD/PV.482, para. 47)

My delegation would like to stress once more that it strongly favours the principle of solving the whole of this problem and of dealing with chemical and bacteriological weapons at one and the same time. That is the only correct method and the most effective one. As the course of the discussion, both in the Committee and at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, has shown, this approach to the solution of the problem is favoured by the majority of the Members of the United Nations.

36. I should also like to mention that the common position of the sponsors of the draft convention with respect to the United Kingdom draft convention has been very clearly described by the Soviet delegation in its working paper of 6 August. Paragraph 3 of that document states:

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

"Attempts to adopt a different approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons and biological weapons and proposals to provide for their prohibition in separate agreements will mean undermining the existing generally recognized rules of international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol, which adopts a unified approach to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons alike. In these conditions the implementation of the United Kingdom proposal, which is based on a separate approach to chemical and bacteriological weapons and provides for the prohibition of the latter alone, constitutes a direct danger in that it will promote the build-up by States of arsenals of chemical weapons and increase the risk of the use of such weapons in international conflicts". (CCD/303).

My delegation fully shares the view on this question expressed on 28 July by Mr. Vejvoda, the representative of Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.482).

37. The Committee will recall that at its meeting of 14 April my delegation laid particular stress on the inconsistency of the arguments for a separate approach to chemical and to bacteriological weapons (CCD/PV.464, para. 42). I can only add to what was said then that the United States amendment (CCD/290) to the United Kingdom draft convention's provision concerning the prohibition of the use of toxins — whose chemical origin was referred to by the United Kingdom delegation (CCD/PV.479, para. 12), which cited document A/7575/Rev.1, paragraph 44 -- does not at all resolve the problem as a whole, inasmuch as toxins alone cannot, in our opinion, cover all other chemical agents subject to prohibition as poisonous substances that can be used for military purposes. That is why the arguments of some delegations alleging that the prohibition of solely biological weapons, with the inclusion of toxins, would not weaken the provisions of the Geneva Protocol but would strengthen them are not at all convincing.

38. I repeat that the most effective and radical solution of the matter under discussion lies in the immediate and comprehensive prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, embodied in a single instrument. Only then would it be possible to state that the historic Geneva Protocol was being further strengthened.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

39. The Mongolian delegation has stated in some detail its views on the problem of verification, on the complex and difficult aspects of that problem (CCD/PV.464, paras. 46 et seq.). In particular we expressed the opinion that it might be possible to set up at the national level a special government agency to ensure strict compliance with the terms of the convention. We also indicated (ibid., para. 49) that the matter might be regulated along the lines of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.1/ To the possible further measures mentioned (ibid., para. 51) I should like to add the idea that, in connexion with a national system of compulsory registration of requirements and output of chemical and bacteriological agents which could be converted into means of warfare, it might be possible also to consider carrying out continuous inspection and control of the date of production of such agents and the length of time they are kept. This might have a bearing on the problem of the international responsibility of States in cases where inexpert destruction of surplus chemical or bacteriological agents results in damage or produces harmful consequences. In this connexion my delegation would refer to article 4 of the proposed convention, which states:

> "Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal and physical persons exercising their activities in its territory, and also by its legal and physical persons outside its territory".

40. Speakers in the Committee have rightly observed that the establishment of an international system for verifying whether or not chemical or bacteriological agents are being produced for military purposes in any given country would entail exceptionally complicated and impracticable procedures owing to the similarity of the processes employed in the production of chemical and bacteriological substances both for peaceful and for military purposes. In the circumstances, the most effective and appropriate course in our opinion would be to use national means and methods of supervision.

41. I should also like to refer to the suggestion of Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, at our meeting on 21 July (CCD/PV.480, para. 6) to include in the preamble to

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 520, pp. 204 et seq.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

the draft convention of the socialist countries a reference to General Assembly resolution 2603 A (XXIV), which reaffirms that the Geneva Protocol embodies the prohibition of the use of all chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare. We consider that that observation of the representative of Sweden can be examined in our further discussions. Another suggestion of the Swedish delegation, concerning the holding of a review conference (ibid., para. 18), coincides with the view which we expressed at the last session of the Committee.

42. Concerning international safeguards, the position of my delegation remains unchanged. The Mongolian delegation as co-sponsor along with the delegations of Poland and Hungary, of the working paper in document CCD/285 remains prepared to keep in touch and exchange views concerning the question of ensuring a reliable system of safeguards and an effective procedure for consideration by the Security Council of cases of possible violation of the terms of the convention.

43. A considerable time has elapsed since the Committee first took up this exceptionally important problem. Members of the Committee have taken considerable trouble to explain their positions on the draft conventions. We have heard statements by experts, and delegations have presented numerous working papers dealing extensively with the technical aspects of the question. In our opinion the excessive involvement of the Committee in discussion of the strictly technical aspects of this problem might create an undesirable situation for the majority which would in no way be conducive to a political solution of the question.

44. In concluding my statement I should like to emphasize that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic sincerely desires to contribute to the further strengthening of the noble spirit of the famous Geneva Protocol; and this desire will unquestionably be served by the speedy conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction.

45. Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Today I should like to express the views of my delegation on the question to which this Committee has to give urgent consideration, namely that of working out a comprehensive disarmament programme.

46. The Government of Japan has always maintained that in order to achieve general and complete disarmament we must work towards it by the steady accumulation and successful implementation of whatever collateral measures can be agreed upon in the meantime. My Government also believes that with a systematic approach more headway would be made in coping with arms-control and disarmament measures. It was for that reason that our delegation to the United Nations General Assembly co-sponsored the draft resolution that became General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), which inter alia requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament --

> "... while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control..." (CCD/275)

47. In this connexion I wish to pay a high tribute to the Italian delegation, which took the initiative in this matter both in the United Nations General Assembly and here in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation considers it significant that many delegations, including those of the co-Chairmen, have expressed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament their valuable views on the question of a comprehensive disarmament programme. We share the view of the Netherlands delegation and various other delegations that the 1961 Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) should form the basis and starting-point for disarmament negotiations leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

48. My delegation also associates itself with those delegations which have stated that in working out a comprehensive disarmament programme special stress should be placed on the close interrelationship between disarmament and international peace and

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security; on strengthening the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations; on the necessity of introducing flexibility into the disarmament programme; on the maintenance of an appropriate balance between measures to prevent armament, measures to limit armament and measures of disarmament; and on the participation of all militarily-important States and in particular of all nuclear-weapon States in disarmament negotiations.

49. As little time is left to us before the end of our summer session, I should like to urge the co-Chairman to make every effort to conclude their consultations with other delegations as soon as possible for the purpose of drawing up the draft of a disarmament programme which would reflect the various views expressed here in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

50. The Government of Japan believes that in a disarmament programme the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The most important event in the 1960s in the field of disarmament was the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*), under which non-nuclear-weapon States parties undertook to renounce the option of possessing nuclear weapons for at least twenty-five years. My Government deems it most urgent and important that nuclear-weapon States should now take prompt and meaningful measures which will lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. It is to the faithful and speedy implementation of the provision of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty that the highest priority and importance should be given during the current Disarmament Decade. It is indeed encouraging to hear that strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union are making steady progress. That will greatly contribute to the easing of international tension and create a climate of confidence and goodwill which will facilitate our work in this Committee.

51. The long-outstanding issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is one of the most important problems in the field of nuclear disarmament. In order to facilitate the

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achievement of an underground test ban, we deem it necessary to promote the further international exchange of seismic data. In addition to the question of prohibiting underground nuclear weapons tests, the question of prohibiting tests of nuclear delivery vehicles should, in our view, also be included in the disarmament programme. My delegation feels that, as the first step leading to their prohibition, tests of strategic nuclear missiles on the high seas should be so regulated as not to impair the sense of security of other nations and not to impinge on peaceful activities such as fishing, sailing and flying on and over the high seas. Japan, as an island nation facing the Pacific Ocean, is bound to feel grave concern over those tests, not to mention the nuclear tests still being conducted in that part of the world.

52. In addition to the need for the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, it is necessary that we tackle also such questions as the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the destruction of nuclear weapons, under effective international control.

53. The complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, which are the other weapons of mass destruction, should also be accorded high priority in the disarmament programme. We should like to urge the countries concerned, pending the complete prohibition of those weapons, to withdraw their reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI).

54. The question of the mutual reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should also be envisaged in the disarmament programme. When measures are implemented to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons, due precautions should be taken to ensure that at no stage during their reduction could any State or group of States gain a military advantage over another, and that the mutual reduction would be well balanced. In that context such elements or factors as the ratio between the number of persons serving in the armed forces and the whole population, as well as the ratio between the amounts of the military expenditures and the gross national products of

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the States concerned, should be taken into consideration. Moreover, geographical circumstances and the prevailing international political atmosphere should of course be taken into account. Also, more attention might well be paid to the establishment of a détente through such measures as the freezing of the military balance in specific areas or regions of conflict. For that purpose it may be necessary to consider the possibility of controlling the export of conventional arms to those areas or regions.

55. Before concluding my remarks I should like to touch upon two questions which should be taken into account in working out a comprehensive programme.

56. The first issue concerns systematic efforts to form a favourable climate of opinion in the field of disarmament. No matter how comprehensive and elaborate a disarmament programme might be, it could hardly be put into practice without the constant support of public opinion, which helps to form the decisions of governments. It is against that background that my delegation attaches special importance to operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), in which the General Assembly --

> "Requests the Secretary-General and Governments to publicize the Disarmament Decade by all appropriate means at their disposal in order to acquaint public opinion with its purposes and objectives and with the negotiations and developments related thereto."

57. In this connexion, my delegation is of the opinion that as concrete measures to mould public opinion the following might well be considered: (a) a periodic review by the United Nations of the actual state of the arms race and military expenditures on the one hand and of the progress achieved in the field of arms control and disarmament negotiations on the other; and (b) the periodic holding of international symposia on the question of disarmament, which might be sponsored by the United Nations or other international organizations.

58. The other issue which I have in mind is related to the furtherance of international co-operation in studies of the scientific and technical aspects of

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disarmament. Up to the present such organizations as the Stockholm International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI) have provided us with valuable scientific and technical knowledge on specific subjects. While highly appreciating the work done by those organizations, we deem it essential that studies be undertaken in a systematic manner and on a more world-wide basis in order to facilitate the solution of the problems of verification, which constitute the key issue in arms control and disarmament measures.

59. Mr. CARACCIOLO (Italy) (interpretation from French): In my statement on 2 July (CCD/PV.475) I dwelt on the Italian delegation's work for a detailed programme of general and complete disarmament. Its most recent step has been to prepare, jointly with a number of other delegations, a text containing some preliminary suggestions. Being convinced of the need to give practical effect to General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) and in particular to its paragraph 4, we have indeed taken a great interest in that preliminary outline, the fruit of a collective effort. This outline constitutes a common foundation out of a number of requirements and considerations which, though different, nevertheless were brought closer together with a view to facilitate the work of the Committee. It is precisely the composite nature of that text which can give rise to a useful discussion within the Conference. For its part, the Italian delegation wishes to draw the attention of the co-Chairman and the other delegations to the advisability of using that text as a precise reference when preparing the report which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must submit to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

60. Many representatives have quite recently dealt in detail in their statements with the specific problem of the detailed programme. Thus, among others, the representatives of the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Yugoslavia, Romania and India have expressed particularly interesting opinions, and this morning we have heard the very relevant and interesting statements of the representative of Japan. For

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our part, we believe that the preparation of a detailed programme will also be especially useful because it will give an impetus to the action of governments on disarmament. Furthermore, certain countries more than others feel it necessary to rationalize the development of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to give international public opinion clear and reassuring information on progress towards the objectives of disarmament. Of course, we realise that we must maintain a certain degree of empiricism if we wish to keep the necessary flexibility in the negotiations and adapt them to the international political context of the moment. But we are convinced that, in order not to lose its momentum in the pursuit of precise ends, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must lay down the guidelines of its action, through the agreement of all its members and confrontation of their various points of view.

61. In concluding my statement on 2 July I refrained from any comment on the text drawn up jointly with other delegations, for fear of changing its collective nature; but I reserved the right to express later my delegation's views. I am doing that today by submitting the working document which the secretariat of the Conference has been good enough to circulate (CCD/309). The ideas of the Italian delegation therefore derive from this collective text, which it wished to emphasize and to reproduce in full in its own working document for the sake both of clarity and of consistency. Moreover, to illustrate our working paper I should like to draw the attention of the Conference to the following considerations.

62. First, in order to take account of the opinions expressed by various delegations, which quite rightly fear the fixing of too precise a timetable and thus the creation of additional obstacles to the work of the Conference, we have avoided suggesting any rigid sequence and any definite time limit for the disarmament measures we have mentioned. While we believe that the idea of sequence is implicit in the disarmament process, we agree that the sequence should perhaps arise from the very dynamics of the negotiations rather than be prematurely crystallized at the outset.

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63. Secondly, in trying to sketch the lines of a programme for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we have taken into account the need for our Conference to continue to negotiate actively the preventive measures and the arms-limitation measures — that is to say, those which are called by agreement collateral measures. Two of them seem to us -- and this is also the opinion of other delegations -- to be more urgent and more important for bringing about the cessation of the nuclear arms race, especially on the desirable assumption of success in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT): cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and total prohibition of nuclear tests. If other delegations have in mind other priorities, it would perhaps be advisable to make every possible effort to reach a common view while taking into account the specific possibilities for the success of each measure proposed.

64. Thirdly, having thus stressed the importance of collateral measures, we believe that the action of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in this field is very useful but insufficient. The main task of our Committee remains in fact to negotiate disarmament; and it therefore seems obvious to us that we must discuss this problem concretely, that fresh efforts in this specific direction must at the very least be tried.

65. That is why we are submitting to the Conference in the working paper we have presented today two parallel suggestions: to set up without delay study programmes on conventional disarmament; and to undertake to negotiate as soon as possible a first instalment in the reduction of conventional weapons. In our document we have not proposed fixed time-limits for the beginning of this negotiation; but we feel that a commitment is indispensable in order to satisfy all those who demand from our Conference more forceful action on disarmament.

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66. We feel that the study programmes, upon which we have dwelt in our working paper, could be of great use for identifying and clarifying problems and for preparing negotiations on reduction. We are also convinced that, if this method of work were accepted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the various delegations could more easily submit specific proposals or suggestions on conventional disarmament.

67. Fourthly, we reaffirm the need for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to resume negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Some delegations have, in this connexion, suggested that the drafts submitted by the United States (ENDC/30 and Add. 1-3) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) in 1962 might be revised. These are clearly the two Powers which will have the last word on whether their drafts, which are still before the Conference, should be revised. For our part, we should like merely to express the wish that, if this is done, account may be taken of the experience gained since 1962. The Italian delegation has already had the opportunity of emphasizing, in its statement on 25 March 1969 (ENDC/PV.397, paras. 62 et seq.), in its working paper of 21 April 1969 (ENDC/245), and lastly in its statement on 26 February 1970 (CCD/PV.453, para. 16), the opinion that the failure of the efforts made in Geneva from 1962 to 1964 was partly due to the attempt to settle the whole question of general and complete disarmament within a single treaty serving as both a programme and an executive agreement. We feel, on the other hand -- still referring to the Joint Statement of 1961 -- that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament must be resumed in a more connected and more flexible manner.

68. In this connexion I should like to recall the statement of the representative of India -- you yourself, Mr. Chairman -- who at our last meeting (CCD/PV.488) summed up very clearly and with your usual effectiveness the essential facts of the problem confronting us. In our opinion the need is to prepare a programme which would serve as a frame laying down the main lines of the negotiations on disarmament; within it we could consider in particular the conclusion of a series of treaties for an effective step-by-step implementation of the disarmament process.

69. Fifthly, before concluding I should like to take up again and clarify a remark which I made at the beginning of my statement. In drawing up our working paper we have adhered to the principle of unicuique suum. In other words, we have wanted to

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distinguish between the work accomplished jointly with a certain number of delegations, and the observations and suggestions which we have added as the Italian delegation and which moreover follow the same collective pattern. We have therefore tried to maintain all the individual quality of that pattern as the expression of a point of view common to a certain number of delegations.

70. Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): In my statement today I intend to deal with the subject of the fourth item on our provisional agenda as presented by the co-Chairmen and accepted by the Committee at its meeting on 15 August 1968 (ENDC/PV.390, para.93): "General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Several delegations have dealt with that question both at the spring session and in the present series of discussions. In their statements they have all stressed the timeliness and importance of this matter, elucidated the problem from numerous angles, and made several suggestions which deserve proper attention and careful study.

71. For a statement on this subject it is hard to find a better epigraph than one of the conclusions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). That resolution, which was unanimously adopted on 20 November 1959, established in its preamble that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today". It is not only that preamble that is still valid today: equally timely is the call upon governments in operative paragraph 1 "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem". On 20 December 1961 the General Assembly, again unanimously, approved resolution 1722 (XVI), which welcomed the Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of America of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) and recommended "that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based upon those principles" (ENDC/139). Those resolutions made it clear that disarmament negotiations must lead ultimately towards the goal of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

72. As a result of several years of negotiations we now have some highly important international treaties already in force: the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) of 1963; the Treaty on principles governing the peaceful use of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex), signed in 1967; and the nuclear

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non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), signed on 1 July 1968. Those instruments expressed the intention of the States parties to the treaties to make further efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament.

73. In the preamble to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty the parties proclaimed as their principal aim "the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament ...". The non-proliferation Treaty went even further. According to article VI, the parties undertake --

> "... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

The results so far achieved in restraining the nuclear arms race, and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States, which were adjourned last week after four months of hard — and we hope useful -- work, to be resumed in November at Helsinki, make it even more timely to continue discussion of the problems of general and complete disarmament. That need is further intensified by General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275), which proclaimed the decade of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade and requested our Committee to work out a comprehensive disarmament programme.

74. Another line of action by the General Assembly -- namely, its resolution 2606 (XXIV) on "The strengthening of international security" -- and the communications (A/7922 and Addenda) which were sent to the Secretary-General by States in response to his letter and which set forth their views and proposals on this very important matter, clearly reflect the urgent necessity for various disarmament measures and for the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

75. The great political thinker of our age, Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin, whose centennial anniversary the world commemorated in April last, emphasized as early as 1916 that "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism". May I recall here that as early as the 1920s the Soviet Government worked out a proposal for general and complete disarmament? The Soviet draft treaty on immediate complete and general disarmament, which was submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Disarmament Conference, envisaged the completion of disarmament in four phases within a period of four years (A/AC.50/2, paras. 138-140).

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76. The Hungarian People's Republic has always paid marked attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament. In multilateral treaties, as well as in bilateral treaties of friendship and co-operation concluded or renewed recently, my country has undertaken international legal obligations to continue its efforts for the maintenance and strengthening of world peace and the security of peoples. The Hungarian Government consistently strives for the lessening of international tension, the halting of the arms race and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The experience of international disarmament negotiations has proved that here we must face an historical process and not some kind of single action. How that process develops, how fast it can progress, depend mainly upon the international political situation. Should we fail to pay due heed to that fact, the whole Disarmament Decade as well as any sort of comprehensive programme may easily become illusory.

77. We must never forget the sad reality that international peace and security are still being threatened by numerous grave events. The war in south-east Asia, the crisis in the Middle East, wars being waged against national liberation movements, the whole system of military bases on foreign territories -- all those are strong elements which hinder progress in the field of disarmament. From that fact it emerges that the main precondition for real progress is the elimination of the causes of international tension. Therefore he who really strives for disarmament should strive also for the elimination of those causes of tension throughout the world.

78. When speaking of some of the main obstacles in the way of progress towards general and complete disarmament, I should not fail to mention also certain promising developments which, if brought to consummation and given a predominant position, could create favourable conditions for making real headway towards general and complete disarmament. In that connection I have in mind the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), the preparations for an all-European security conference, and other promising developments.

79. My delegation represents a European socialist country whose capital was the scene of the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty over a year ago. At that time the participants in that Conference made an appeal to all European States "to increase their efforts for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe" (A/7536). Let me therefore go into some details of the developments leading to that document.

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80. In recent years the realization has been gaining strength and spreading in ever wider circles in Europe that the peoples of that continent should not live in conditions that are constantly charged with the danger of new military conflicts. The countries of Europe, irrespective of their social and political systems, have one important thing in common -- they all need peace and institutionalized security.

81. Guided by that spirit, the States members of the Warsaw Treaty proposed in their appeal that "an all-European conference should be called to discuss the questions of European security and peaceful co-operation" (ibid.). Further to that proposal, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty countries, at their meetings in Prague last October and in Budapest this June, made suggestions concerning the agenda of such a conference. The memorandum adopted at the latest ministerial meeting expressed the view that the interests of reducing tension and bringing about security in Europe would be promoted by a discussion of the question of the reduction of foreign armed forces on the territories of European States. Such discussions could be held by the organ proposed to be established by the security conference, or could be carried out in any other form acceptable to the interested parties.

82. The Hungarian delegation is convinced that the convocation of an all-European security conference as a result of joint efforts by all interested States would contribute significantly to easing tension, strengthening security and developing peaceful co-operation in Europe. The incessant striving for the elimination of the causes of international tension is a very important but not the only precondition to real progress in the field of disarmament. The Hungarian delegation is in full agreement with the view of those who maintain that measures of general and complete disarmament can be properly negotiated and effectively implemented only with the full participation of all militarily-significant countries, and in the first place of all nuclear Powers.

83. We have been following with special attention and studying carefully every suggestion relating to questions of general and complete disarmament or to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme. We believe, however, that it would not serve the purpose if the Committee were to try to work out a programme confined within a framework of minute details, rigid schemes and time-limits; neither would it be

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practicable to work out an abstract programme. In our view the problem should be approached in a realistic, flexible and, above all, constructive manner. For the examination and evaluation of the contents and substance of measures of general and complete disarmament, it is most important to enumerate the problems which are the most pressing or which are the most mature for solution.

84. The greatest danger still threatening mankind is the possibility of a thermo-nuclear holocaust. That is why we must do all in our power to eliminate that possibility. Hence it follows that, in our approach to general and complete disarmament as well as in a comprehensive programme, nuclear disarmament must be given top priority. We believe that the principles concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, as declared in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, should be concretized as soon as possible in a multilateral international treaty. The conclusion in resolution 2164 (XXI) that --

> "... the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament ..." (ENDC/185)

is constantly valid.

85. One of the most important problems connected with nuclear disarmament before the Committee is the ban on underground nuclear test explosions. The achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be a large step towards complete nuclear disarmament. In relation to that question there has been a long exchange of opinions about the problem of verification. We appreciate the efforts made to elucidate the scientific and technical details of the matter; but, as my Government pointed out in its reply to the Secretary-General's questionnaire relating to the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data,

> "... the solution of the problem today is not a scientific and technical question but a matter of policy decision, that of willingness to stop the underground tests". (A/7967/Add. 3, p. 24)

86. The prohibition and elimination of the other kind of weapons of mass destruction -- chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons -- is one of the urgent questions before our Committee. The negotiation and elaboration of a draft convention on that

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matter should be given priority not only in our work but also in any sort of comprehensive programme. Our attention and efforts must be focused on the statement made so rightly by the Secretary-General that States should —

> "... reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons". (A/7575/Rev.1, p. xii)

87. If our negotiations on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed are brought to fruition at the present session, and if we succeed in presenting a draft treaty to the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the General Assembly, then we may have good reason to hope that the opening of the treaty to signature will be one of the meaningful highlights of that twenty-fifth anniversary session. The Hungarian delegation emphasizes, however, the necessity to pursue negotiations for the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

88. Speaking about various disarmament questions, several delegations have referred briefly or at greater length to the subject of verification; working papers and suggestions have been presented on the problem. All this proves that members of the Committee attach great importance to the matter. Nobody can deny that provisions on verification form an integral and also an essential part of any disarmament measure. When States undertake obligations to limit their military power, they want to be sure that nobody will violate the obligations assumed, thus gaining illegal advantages over the other contracting parties. A proper and effective system of verification definitely increases confidence in a given disarmament measure. But can even the most perfect verification system make up for a lack of willingness to adopt that measure? Should we not fear that protracted debates on verification details, which are not supported by the sincere desire to move forward, will only result in increased suspicion and distrust? We believe firmly that if delegations sitting down at the Conference table were provided with the political decision to adopt a planned disarmament measure, a solution to details of verification would be found more easily and faster.

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89. Before concluding my statement let me emphasize once again that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic consistently stands for the achievement of general and complete disarmament and wants to do everything in its power to promote that goal.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 489th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M.A. Husain, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Mongolia, Japan, Italy and Hungary.

"The delegation of Italy submitted a working paper on a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/309).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 25 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.490
25 August 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. R. CARACCIOLO (Italy)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. D.F. NATARIO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. F. MARESKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. F. GAJDA
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. H. TANAKA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. K. ANDO
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
	Mr. T. KABBAJ
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. C. MITRAN
	Mr. N. CHILIE
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. M.S. DRAZ
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (interpretation from French): I declare open the 490th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): The problem of general and complete disarmament has received considerable attention in the statements of delegations, not only in connexion with the Disarmament Decade and respective resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly but also from a number of other points of view. It can be said that theoretical questions regarding the drafting of a plan of further disarmament measures have been discussed very thoroughly.

3. At previous meetings of the Committee, views on the clarification of issues connected with the drafting of the disarmament programme have been expressed by the delegations of Japan (CCD/PV.471), the United States (CCD/PV.472), Canada (CCD/PV.473), Italy (CCD/PV.475), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.478), Sweden (ibid.), Yugoslavia (ibid.), Romania (CCD/PV.485), the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.486), India (CCD/PV.488), Hungary (CCD/PV.489) and others. We should like to point out in our statement, without expressing our agreement or disagreement with what those delegations have said, that we consider as important and useful the aim sought by most delegations: that is, the clarification, first of all, of the fundamental questions — questions of theory, so to speak — which should be applied in practice in the drawing-up of the concrete plan.

4. It ensues from many statements concerning questions of general and complete disarmament that many delegations approach that question seriously and warn against hasty actions. For example, the representative of the United States said at our meeting on 23 June: "For unless a measure accords with the realities of world affairs, the measure will not be achieved simply by including in it some sort of schedule." (CCD/PV.472, para. 22). The representative of Canada stated at our meeting on 25 June:

> "We hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will not become involved in attempting to draft an elaborate and exhaustive programme for the Disarmament Decade, but will agree on a flexible formula of objectives to be presented to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly..." (CCD/PV.473, para. 11).

5. In this connexion we should also like to recall the statement of the representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Eschauzier, in which he reminded us of the special reservation made by the Netherlands delegation at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to the proposed text of resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275), and in which he expressed the position of his country as

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regards the elaboration of the programme for the Disarmament Decade from the point of view of a time limit. He said:

> "... we saw this particular task ahead of us as an unfolding pattern rather than as a single exercise -- one short operation, so to speak, which could be successfully completed in the limited period between two consecutive sessions of the General Assembly." (CCD/PV.478, para. 5)

6. The representative of India, Mr. Husain, stressed in his statement at our meeting on 18 August that the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) could be the basis for our concrete work on general and complete disarmament (CCD/PV.488, para. 9). That approach seems to be in accord with our opinion that at the present phase of the deliberations the determination of principles can be of the same significance as the drafting of concrete measures. In that respect the Soviet representative, Mr. Roshchin, made an important statement at our meeting on 11 August. In that statement (CCD/PV.486, para. 21) he gave a clear answer to the question of what principles should be followed in the drafting of the programme of further disarmament measures when he emphasized the validity of the 1961 Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, which was approved at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 1722 (XVI)).

7. When we consider the programme of further disarmament measures it is necessary to bear in mind constantly that such a plan should be realistic and should correspond to the fundamental views of the majority of participants in the negotiations. We could hardly succeed if we were to make hasty proposals for measures in a field which some participants in the negotiations consider as an inevitable or even vitally important component of their defence. With that is connected the question of the universality of some measures. We cannot expect that a country would accept certain measures without a guarantee that its neighbour would do the same. The representative of Japan referred to this at our meeting on 18 June when he said: "One of the prerequisites for attaining the goal of general and complete disarmament is the participation of all the militarily-important States" (CCD/PV.471, para. 34).

8. Similarly it would not be useful to come forward with proposals which it could be seen at first sight were made, as an old Czech proverb says, in order to let the wolf fill his stomach but the goat remain alive — that is, measures which would be taken only for the sake of doing something. That would lead to deceiving world opinion;

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and we do not regard as a genuine disarmament measure one which would result only in the destruction of those military materials of which some countries have in any case an unnecessary surplus.

9. It has also been rightly observed here on several occasions that the solution of complicated fundamental questions requiring a political decision cannot be replaced by the production of diagrams and tables and by the determination of fixed time limits within which this or that should be done. In saying that, we do not wish to imply that we would object to the drafting of a programme of further disarmament measures. The socialist countries have put forward a plan of concrete disarmament measures on several occasions. In 1968 it was the Soviet delegation that submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and to our Committee a concrete programme of disarmament measures in its memorandum (ENDC/227).

10. As regards concrete measures at the present time we are of the opinion that, after the Committee has completed work on the draft treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed (CCD/269/Rev.2), the next item of primary importance in the programme of further disarmament measures is the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We shall of course continue to deal with the problem of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed; and then there is the question of the prohibition of underground tests and some other latent problems. In our opinion it will be necessary to state in the report to the General Assembly that we have thoroughly discussed, besides other things, a number of theoretical aspects of the programme of further disarmament measures and that we have confirmed the validity of the 1961 Agreed Principles.

11. A great many proposals may emerge as to what should be discussed in the field of disarmament. Therefore it will be necessary to give due consideration to all such proposals before they become an official programme of the Committee. As a matter of fact, the question of priorities in connexion with the drafting of the programme may prove to be as complicated as the drafting itself. It will be necessary to proceed sensitively and prudently, to investigate the views of all participants in the negotiations and to take into consideration all their comments, in the same way as the Committee has considered during the present session the proposals for measures in the field of the denuclearization of the sea-bed. We are prepared to study carefully every initiative in that direction and to give it positive consideration, when all members of the Committee have been duly consulted, if it would correspond to the given situation and would not violate any of the principles agreed in 1961.

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12. The forthcoming interval in the deliberations of our Committee will be filled with intensive work at the General Assembly and also with bilateral and multilateral negotiations. We shall have enough time and sufficient opportunities, therefore, to consider thoroughly the programme for further disarmament measures and to sound out each other's views before the resumption of this Committee's work at the beginning of next year, when we can return to it as the first item on our agenda.

13. We should like to point out also how important it is for the future that all delegations should approach the programme of our work and disarmament measures with as much sincerity as possible — that is, that they should seek solutions, not just excuses and reasons why one or other problem cannot be solved. Thus we come to the question of the so-called political decisions. It is quite clear that no delegation in this Committee can negotiate measures for which it does not have a green light from its Government. That green light is the political decision, which may be accompanied, of course, by various conditions and "ifs". The fundamental decision to achieve one agreement or another often exists, but the problems are so imprecise that it is necessary to clarify them first; or, as one representative said recently -- I think at an informal meeting — it is necessary "to render problems into a negotiable form". Our discussion on the problems of the programme for further disarmament measures is certainly an important part of that rendering into a negotiable form.

14. Some delegations raised a question which, in a simplified form, might go something like this: "What first -- disarmament, or other measures for the relaxation of tension?". We should like to say a few words about that question at the conclusion of our statement, since we consider its clarification to be an important matter.

15. Recently the argument has often been heard that, before we discuss disarmament, this or that world problem should be solved. We heard such voices before the beginning of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT); and sometimes we hear them also in our Committee before we start considering a decision of greater importance. But we have also heard the opposite, although not in this Committee: that we should achieve progress on certain disarmament measures before starting negotiations on, for example, regional security. We should like to emphasize that to bind one thing with another is essentially a wrong approach. Discussion as to what should be done first resembles the familiar debate on what came first, the chicken or the egg.

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16. It is certain — and our Committee should keep this principle always in mind — that disarmament negotiations must not wait for some other negotiations; and, again, that the latter must not be made dependent on progress in the field of disarmament. Logically they support each other. We have seen that the very fact that the SALT talks began led to the improvement of the international atmosphere. A similar improvement of the atmosphere in the world was felt, as we all know, after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*); and certainly we all remember what a significant influence the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) had on the change of situation in the world. On the other hand, we are convinced that it would help the progress of disarmament negotiations if an agreement were achieved as regards the convening of the conference on European security, without binding it to what should be done first, or to progress in the disarmament field being achieved before such a conference could take place.

17. In his statement on 13 August the representative of the United States informed us (CCD/PV.487, para. 56) that the Foreign Ministers of the member States of NATO had called for discussions on the possibility of achieving a greater degree of security in Europe and had proposed certain disarmament negotiations connected therewith. We welcomed the information given to the Committee on 20 August by the representative of Hungary, Mr. Kömives (CCD/PV.489, para. 81), that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States adhering to the Warsaw Treaty, at their meeting in Budapest in June, had also expressed their views regarding the possibility of achieving a greater degree of security on the European continent. At the meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty States held in Moscow on 20 August, all participants expressed their firm determination to take further steps, together with other interested States, towards the strengthening of European security, and to take all available active measures to implement in the nearest possible future the proposal to convene the all-European conference.

18. The Czechoslovak Government attaches great significance to the convening of the conference on European security. It has always striven to contribute to the maximum relaxation of tension in Europe and, as regards disarmament, is prepared to do its best to ensure the sucess of such disarmament measures as will lead to the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament, which is shared by the peoples of the whole world.

19. Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): In my statement today I should like to express the views of the Pakistan delegation on the question of general and complete disarmament. In its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) the General Assembly urged the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, and to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations.

20. The goal of general and complete disarmament remains as distant as ever. We live in a world of hard realities; and it is essential, therefore, to recognize the close interdependence of international peace and security and general and complete disarmament. If our efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament are not to remain a theoretical exercise, they must be accompanied by concrete steps towards a peaceful world. Here, I might also recall the first of the principles agreed in 1961 by the United States and the USSR and approved by the General Assembly: that —

> "(a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/5, p. 1)

It is evident that what is required initially is the undertaking of confidence-building measures which would create an international atmosphere conducive to the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament. It is only by creating mutual confidence among nations through effective measures designed to remove the real causes of conflicts and contentions that a beginning can be made.

21. We believe that it is steadfast adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and abiding respect for its provisions that will enable nations to generate mutual confidence. We must first resolve to carry out honestly and faithfully our obligations under the United Nations Charter, and take all necessary steps in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter to settle the differences that vitiate the political climate and prevent the strengthening of mutual confidence.

22. It is in large measure a fact that there has been little progress in recent years in promoting just and peaceful solutions of disputes and situations which constitute a danger to international peace and security. The existence of such

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disputes poses a threat to world peace, and we believe that their solution in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and international agreement would be a great positive factor for peace. Here I should like to quote the following from the statement of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 14 July:

> "... we should from now on specifically seek to introduce in a comprehensive programme for disarmament direct correlation with other United Nations activities. Pari passu with disarmament, a strengthening must take place of the United Nations machinery for establishing friendly relations; for settling disputes; for keeping a watch on conflicts brewing; for equipping task forces to observe and, in accordance with specific mandates, supervise standstill agreements, contested frontiers, evacuation of troops, national elections in formerly-contested areas; and for other peace-keeping activities in general." (CCD/PV.478, para. 30)

23. While sharing that view my delegation would like to point out that it is not enough for the peace-keeping measures to be strengthened; it is equally if not more important that the peace-keeping measures should also be elaborated. The United Nations machinery should be strengthened not only to supervise elections in formerly-contested areas, but also to translate into reality the inalienable right to self-determination of peoples under alien rule. We are also of the view that the United Nations machinery for achieving decolonization and the elimination of racial and religious discrimination needs to be strengthened.

24. We have today a situation in the world where States, large and small, stand divided and even opposed to each other. In these circumstances it is difficult to visualize significant progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament unless specific steps have been taken for confidence-building measures and to remove the causes of tensions, global and regional.

25. We believe that the most important step in the field of disarmament is the curbing of the strategic nuclear arms race, and nuclear disarmament. In this respect the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States on strategic nuclear arms limitation (SALT) are of vital importance. From reports in the Press it appears that progress has been made; and we sincerely hope that a mutually-acceptable solution will be found.

26. An important factor which has hampered real progress in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, is the absence of France and the People's Republic of China from disarmament negotiations. We believe it is absolutely essential that

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the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in all international forums should be restored and that it should be made possible for China to participate in the disarmament negotiations. We also hope that France will take its place in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at an early date.

27. My delegation believes that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should not allow itself to get bogged down in an attempt to draw up a rigid, comprehensive and all-inclusive disarmament programme with a more or less fixed time-table. The Pakistan delegation feels that the ultimate purpose would be better served if our approach to this programme were flexible and pragmatic.

28. While confirming the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament and outlining a flexible programme to that end, the Committee should concentrate on objectives which can be spelt out in relation to the specific measures which become ripe for implementation. Those measures include the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed; the elimination of chemical and biological weapons; the prevention of the further proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, of nuclear weapons; and a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. And, as the Committee proceeds with its task, it could also consider measures that might be negotiated in the future.

29. Representatives in this Committee will recall that Pakistan was among the countries which voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution (2373 (XXII)) commending the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). We fully subscribe to its objectives, and it is a matter of satisfaction to us that the non-proliferation Treaty has entered into force. But, as we stated in the General Assembly at the time of the Treaty's adoption, the effectiveness of the Treaty will basically depend on the extent of the adherence it commands. We note with regret that some threshold nuclear Powers have neither adhered to it nor expressed agreement with its objectives.

30. In that context we regard it as essential to draw attention to the fact that the non-proliferation Treaty bans all nuclear explosive devices. It does not recognize any difference -- since there is no difference -- between nuclear weapons and the so-called peaceful nuclear devices. Indeed, the provisions of article V of the Treaty, as well as the statements made in the General Assembly during the debate on the Treaty, especially by the nuclear Powers, leave no doubt that any State which manufactures a so-called peaceful nuclear explosive device does in fact violate the provisions and defeat the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty. We firmly believe that any attempt by a non-nuclear State to produce and store so-called

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peaceful nuclear explosive devices would create a situation endangering not only the peace and security of the region concerned but ultimately the peace and security of the whole world. My delegation hopes that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will recognize the seriousness of the situation and include in its report suitable suggestions for consideration by the General Assembly.

31. Some statements have been made about measures of conventional disarmament on a regional basis. The Pakistan delegation holds the view that, if that problem is to be tackled realistically, we must first devise effective measures to remove the causes of regional tensions and conflicts. Without that first essential step, any approach on a regional basis would be impracticable. For promoting peace in a region, as much as for promoting peace in the world, the States concerned should manifest genuine respect for the rights of others and scrupulously observe, in letter and in spirit, international agreements. It is only then that a beginning towards the elaboration of measures of regional conventional disarmament will become feasible.

32. In conclusion I should like to refer to operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV). We share the view expressed by the delegations of Brazil and Sweden, and others, that there should be a co-relationship between the savings resulting from measures of disarmament and the channelling of such savings for the economic development of the developing countries.

33. Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic): Acknowledging the ever-increasing concern of world public opinion and responding to the wish of the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has this year given detailed and productive consideration to the prohibition of chemical and biological warfare. As is known, that particular issue, unlike other disarmament problems, has already been covered by an international instrument, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI); and the clear desire has repeatedly been expressed, both in the General Assembly and here in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that the principles and objectives of the Protocol should be strictly observed by all States. Furthermore, the States which have not as yet acceded to or ratified that all-important document have been invited to do so; while the Committee on Disarmament has been requested to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on further prohibitions to complement the Protocol.

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34. In view of the foregoing, one might have been justified in expecting certain developments to occur which would provide concrete evidence of the seriousness with which the over-all issue was being approached, namely: first, that there would be an increase in the number of new countries adhering to the Protocol -- which did happen, but only to a very limited, I would even say disappointing, extent; second, that States would withdraw the reservations they had made to the Protocol -- but we observe that, on the contrary, some of those States which have recently adhered to the Protocol have done so with reservations; and, third, that a new international instrument would be negotiated to complement the Protocol by dealing with further prohibitions concerning chemical and biological warfare, that is development, production and stockpiling -- and it is that latter point that has chiefly been the object of our deliberations here.

35. Before entering into the subject proper, I should like to point out that that purpose, too, has not yet been achieved. Instead we have been confronted by unilateral statements by some countries regarding their renunciation of biological weapons. While we applaud such steps as being positive, especially in the case of the United States of America -- which has not as yet ratified the Protocol -- we hope nevertheless that they are intended only to bridge the period which still separates us from agreement on a new international and comprehensive instrument, since we believe that such unilateral declarations would bind their proponents only in a political and a moral manner and not in a strictly legal manner. Furthermore, they do not provide for multilateralism or for homogeneity in treatment. Indeed, were we all to renounce unilaterally possession of weapons of mass destruction in a form and by wording of our own particular choice, that might, on the contrary, produce a variety of declarations each substantially different from or contradictory to the other, and thus the elaboration of an international instrument binding on all parties would be even more difficult to achieve.

36. Our extensive discussions regarding the fundamentals to be considered in a new international instrument concerning chemical and biological warfare have uncovered many technical features pertinent to the issue. That has been both important and useful; yet at the same time it has become apparent to all that those particular features are not the only ones in need of our attention. Indeed, side by side with them there are aspects of no less significance, if not of altogether more importance: namely the political aspects.

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37. Moreover, our deliberations here have contributed also towards clarifying points of agreement and of difference. The latter are not, however, of an artificial and a procedural nature, as has been suggested, but have indeed a very substantive content, to such an extent that it is hardly possible for the present to enter into a comparison between the United Kingdom and the socialist approaches as reflected in the respective drafts submitted (CCD/255/Rev.2* and A/7655).

38. Our common study here has, furthermore, clearly indicated, we believe, the desire of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to narrow the gap between those opposing positions. That desire has been reflected, though in an insufficient manner, in the amendments subsequently included in the two drafts. It has also been reflected in the wealth of suggestions and ideas that have been advanced during our deliberations with a view to overcoming one or another of the difficulties we have encountered.

39. Turning our attention now to the question of the weapons to be banned in the forthcoming treaty, we should like to remind the Conference that we have stated from the very beginning, together with others, that we prefer that the next agreement should ban both chemical and biological weapons. It is our considered view that the reasons that have made it impossible so far for some countries to subscribe to that position are more of a political than of a technical nature. I shall not discuss here and now the arguments which were put forward in favour of each position, since other delegations have already done so and there really is no need to be repetitive.

40. Nevertheless, we ask ourselves: would it be wise for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament not to take account of the urgency of reaching agreement on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, as requested by the General Assembly and as rightly expected by world public opinion? They are not convinced, and neither are we, that the chemical weapons which are at present stockpiled for immediate use by trained armies and which are being steadily improved upon by an array of scientists and technicians pose a danger less imminent than that posed by biological weapons, which have never been used and which are not likely to be used in the foreseeable future.

41. Thus it would seem to us a logical conclusion that biological weapons, whose use we all agree without exception is a more remote possibility than that of chemical weapons, need not be dealt with alone while allowing the latter to be further developed, further produced and further stockpiled, making their prohibition with every

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day that goes by an ever-more-difficult and complex task to accomplish. To our mind the very arguments put forward by both the United States and the United Kingdom delegations add considerable strength to such a conclusion. Yet we are still asked to give preferential treatment to biological weapons, which pose an uncertain danger, while postponing agreement on chemical weapons, which constitute the most certain of perils.

42. If such an attitude were to be adopted, if once again the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were to deal with a measure of disarmament by instalments, it would undoubtedly generate a feeling of frustration, if not of anger; and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would lay itself open to severe criticism.

43. Having thus referred to the reality of the situation, we now deem to be insufficient the argument that chemical weapons cannot be banned for the present because of severe difficulties in defining the weapons or finding an adequate procedure for verification. Though we do not in the least belittle the difficulties encountered in this respect, we believe that they are not of such a nature as to make the finding of an acceptable solution an impossible enterprise, especially if and when the political will to do so is made available.

44. Our belief that we should ban these weapons simultaneously does not mean, however, that we shall not welcome a flexible approach when the Committee applies itself to drafting the provisions of a treaty, or that the particular and different nature of the two kinds of weapons should not be fully considered whenever necessary, without prejudice of course to the unity of the international instrument we are proposing and the purpose for which it is being drawn up. In that connexion I should like to state that we do not consider that article V of the United Kingdom draft convention, whereby the parties undertake

"... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to strengthen the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare" (CCD/255/Rev. 2*),

offers adequate guarantees that, in practice, this will produce the urgent result for which we all hope. As a matter of fact, such a pledge seems to us too general in character, since it does not bind those who are prepared to subscribe to it to more than the mere pursuance of negotiations within an indefinite period.

45. Since I am dwelling on the flexible approach to which we all could subscribe, I should now like to comment on the proposal contained in the Moroccan working paper (CCD/295) introduced by the representative of Morocco, Mr. Khattabi, on 28 July

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(CCD/PV.482, paras. 41-47), in which it is suggested that chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be jointly prohibited by one principal legal instrument which would also make provision for their destruction. As for the procedures of verification, each weapon would be dealt with separately. Those concerning bacteriological (biological) weapons would be dealt with in the principal instrument, which would also provide precise terms for a further examination aiming at the conclusion within a fixed period of an agreement on definite verification procedures concerning chemical weapons.

46. It is unnecessary to remind the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that this proposal was explicitly submitted with a view to helping to reconcile the ideas expressed in the Conference and to searching for a way out of our impasse in the field of verification. There can be no doubt that such a proposal has certain merits, as it avoids many of the difficulties or inconveniences that have been raised by well-meaning suggestions. While preserving the unity of approach, it endeavours to be flexible by giving suitable treatment to both types of weapons. My delegation therefore looks with interest upon such an approach, which could offer a way out if agreement on what constitutes adequate procedures of verification concerning chemical weapons proved, regrettably, to be unattainable in the near future.

47. As regards the scope of the prohibition, in our view it should be as comprehensive as possible and include the full range of both chemical and biological weapons, in order to avoid all the interpretations which have been advanced — wrongly, in the view of the General Assembly — concerning the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and which seek to limit the prohibitions contained therein to lethal weapons only. In other words, we believe that the new provisions should include all chemical and biological weapons, whether lethal, harassing or incapacitating, so that no doubts whatsoever may any longer subsist in that respect.

48. However, the prohibition merely of the weapons, even if it were most comprehensive, would still leave open the issue of the agents of which those weapons in fact are made up. That particular point has caught our interest, and we followed with great attention the highly pertinent analysis in that connexion (CCD/PV.457, paras. 38 et seq.) made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 12 March. Of course, to understand and cover the relationship and implivation of agents in connexion with our work here, we should have to go into some technical details. At the same time, we must not blind ourselves to the difficulties which we shall inevitably face where practical application is concerned.

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49. All that leads me to believe that we need not burden the draft treaty with too many details; and we favour the suggestion, therefore, that they be worked out independently, though joined to the principal instrument. That seems to us to be an almost obligatory procedure, since these agents are in an endless process of development and the way is open to further discoveries which would make additions and amendments to and deletions from any comprehensive list a necessity for the future. It would suffice, therefore, to indicate in the treaty in a general manner how we intend to proceed regarding this matter, while working out the technical details in another form.

50. We believe that, as stipulated in article II of the United Kingdom draft, possession of —

"... such ... ancillary equipment or vectors as have been produced or otherwise acquired for hostile purposes ..." (CCD/255/Rev.2*)

should be prohibited. We favour, too, the inclusion in the treaty of a stipulation providing for the elimination of actual stockpiles, which should take place with certain publicity and within a given time limit after the entry into force of the treaty.

51. I come now to the question of the various stages to be embodied in the prohibition. It is clear that the ban must cover development, production and stockpiles. But, in addition to that, should we once again prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons in spite of the fact that the Geneva Protocol already sufficiently covers that particular point? According to the United Kingdom draft, we should. It is suggested that there are many advantages to this, such as further strengthening the Protocol, ridding it of the reservations attached to it, and eliminating doubts concerning the range of weapons the use of which is to be prohibited. Without in the least belittling those arguments, we nevertheless tend to prefer that the new instrument should not refer to the prohibition of use, since that was the very purpose of the Geneva Protocol. For the question arises, what would happen to the Protocol were we in another document once again to prohibit use?

52. Furthermore, I would refer to our statement of 26 August 1969, in which we already pointed out (CCD/PV.431, paras. 28-30) the great difficulties that could stem from covering one and the same point in two different international instruments. As for ridding the Protocol of the reservations thereto, as has been suggested, it could be

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pointed out that there is no assurance — speaking theoretically, at least — that the new instrument too would not have some kind of reservations attached to it. Moreover, a reservation to the Protocol can be withdrawn by the country which made it, and not necessarily through the conclusion of a new international instrument. In addition, it must be remembered that the treaty would provide for the elimination of all stockpiles; thus none of these weapons would be left to be used as a means of deterrence, attack or retaliation, as was so rightly observed (CCD/PV.462, para. 89) by the representative of Nigeria in his statement on 7 April.

53. As regards the issue of verification, we have observed that during our discussions many delegations, if not a majority of them, have followed a general trend, the main points of which could be summarized as follows:

First, chemical weapons cannot be banned without adequate verification.

Secondly, agreement on a procedure for verification, despite apparent difficulties, is not beyond our reach.

Thirdly, verification need not be 100 per cent effective; that would be both unnecessary and impossible of achievement.

Fourthly, verification has both a technical and a political aspect; we must strive as hard as we possibly can to reconcile those two aspects.

Fifthly, the aspects of verification must be considered in such a way as to produce a solution properly adjusted to present-day facts and conditions.

Sixthly, procedures for verification should be both national and international; they should complement one another in the most suitable manner.

54. Having thus interpreted the general direction of the thoughts expressed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject, we feel that verification procedures would have to fulfil two purposes: a preventive one, to seek to ensure that a violation does not occur; and a curative one, to ascertain responsibilities in case a violation has been committed. Benefiting from the many suggestions and ideas put forward in that respect, we believe that these purposes could perhaps be best achieved by the following means.

55. First, each State party to the treaty should take, within a certain period from the entry into force of the treaty, all necessary legal, administrative and other practical measures conducive to ensuring respect for the prohibitions and the elimination of stockpiles of the banned weapons. Furthermore, each party should inform the Security Council, or perhaps an impartial international body agreed upon,

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of the steps it has taken in this regard, as well as on the completion of the elimination of its stockpiles. That procedure could be reported whenever deemed necessary.

56. Secondly, each State party is to undertake to forward relevant and basic information, to be agreed upon, to the above-mentioned impartial international body with a view to assisting the technical process of verification. Furthermore, existing competent international organs, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and so forth could be called upon for assistance.

57. Thirdly, in case doubt arose concerning the activities of a State, that would have to be reported to the Security Council, which could undertake the necessary investigation measures. A complaint could of course be lodged directly with the Security Council.

58. These procedures, like in fact the whole treaty, would notably increase in efficacy and credibility if, in accordance with the precedents established, there were to be incorporated into the treaty a provision on withdrawal as well as a provision regarding a review conference. That would be a proper incentive for adherence to the treaty as well as a safeguard ensuring respect for all of the obligations undertaken.

59. I believe it is apparent that there are no new elements in those views; yet to us they seem to a suitable extent to reconcile flexibility with reliability, at least in a first stage -- that is, up to the time of the review conference, when we would have to look at their efficacy in the light of the experience gained.

60. We are of course fully prepared to pursue discussion on this matter. In this respect we would join the representative of India, Mr. Husain, in requesting the United States and the United Kingdom delegations, as he did at our plenary meeting on 20 August (CCD/PV.489, para. 21), to concretize their views on how we could make headway on this important matter.

61. Mr. BOZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): I have the honour, on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia -- that is to say, on behalf of the group of twelve countries -- to introduce a joint memorandum on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare (CCD/310). The document has already been distributed to the delegations and I assume there is no need for me to read it out.

(Mr. Bozinovic, Yugoslavia)

62. In introducing this memorandum I should like to state briefly the reason for its submission by the group of twelve, and to draw attention to its main points. The reason for submitting this memorandum lies primarily in the strong belief of those countries that it would be in the general interest of all States for the solution of the complex problem of chemical and biological weapons to be speeded up, and that by submitting the joint memorandum at this stage the twelve countries would contribute to the attainment of that aim.

63. In submitting the memorandum the group has thought it necessary to stress three main points. The first point is the importance and urgency of the solution of the problem of chemical and biological weapons — an importance and urgency which are so widely felt in the world today. The first five paragraphs of this document are devoted to that point.

64. The second point the group wanted to stress is that —

> "It is essential that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States." (ibid., para. 6)

The group also wanted to express its conviction that "an effective solution of the problem should be sought on this basis".

65. The third point made in the joint memorandum is the importance of the solution of the problem of verification. In the view of the group of twelve, this problem should be solved in such a way as "to inspire confidence in the implementation of any agreement in the field of C and B weapons" (ibid., para. 7), and —

> "Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system which would ensure effective implementation of the prohibition."

66. The group of twelve, in submitting this memorandum, would like to express its hope that the approach to the solution of the problem of chemical and biological weapons outlined in the memorandum will prove to be generally acceptable.

67. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): In our discussions of chemical and biological weapons, considerable interest has been demonstrated regarding the potential usefulness of reporting and data-monitoring procedures of various kinds in the enforcement of a chemical-weapons ban. As a contribution to these discussions our

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

delegation wishes to share with the Committee, in the form of a working paper which is being circulated today (CCD/311), some results of research conducted by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the potential of economic monitoring as applied to chemical weapons.

68. Delegations will note that for the sake of economy of presentation, and because nerve gases are particularly important, the research summarized in the working paper focuses on organophosphorous nerve agents. The first part of the paper discusses the operation of a system for monitoring the production and consumption of materials used for the manufacture of nerve agents; the second part deals with what our research has shown to be some of the limitations and problems of economic monitoring; and the final section of the paper offers some preliminary conclusions and comments on the effectiveness of economic monitoring as a verification technique.

69. I shall not elaborate on the working paper in further detail, since I am sure that delegations will want to study it carefully themselves. For our part we would hope that our efforts will be a useful complement to research in this general area which is being conducted by other countries also interested in the various aspects of verifying a ban on chemical weapons.

70. Before concluding I should like also to mention that, in response to requests from a number of other delegations, we should like to make more widely available the text of the presentation by Dr. Joshua Lederberg at our informal meeting on 5 August. I am providing the text to the Secretariat and would ask that it be distributed as a working paper.1/

71. Mr. DATCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): The Romanian delegation would like to express some views concerning the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.2). In dealing with this subject, which has been fully examined during the past three sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, we take as a starting-point resolution 2602 F (XXIV) (CCD/275) of 16 December 1969, which called upon the Committee to study the draft treaty, taking into account the suggestions and proposals made by various States, so that it could be submitted to the General Assembly for completion.

1/ Circulated later as document CCD/312.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

72. The Romanian delegation has from the outset declared itself in favour of an agreement on the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Our views on the criteria which should form the basis of the establishment of such an international instrument, as well as proposals concerning the content of the document, have been presented in earlier statements of the Romanian delegation in the Committee on Disarmament and during debates in the United Nations. As we have already had occasion to state, an international regulation on the prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed should, as we see it, meet a number of principal requirements, among which are the following:

It should prevent the extension of the dangerous and costly competition in armaments to an extremely vast area of our planet, while at the same time it should, as a collateral measure, contribute to the establishment of favourable conditions for the conclusion of disarmament agreements proper.

It should be integrated in wider international action aimed at the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for exclusively peaceful purposes and development of the riches of that environment to meet the needs of peace, progress and the well-being of the peoples of the world.

The agreements designed to achieve the military prohibition and to promote the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, as laid down in the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in the past few years.

The status of the zone as one excluded from the sphere of the arms race in the environment of the sea-bed and the ocean floor can be established and applied solely by strictly respecting the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of the various States concerning the territorial seas and the continental shelf, and the principle of freedom of the high seas.

Lastly, to be viable and effective and completely to fulfil its purpose, an international regulation in this field, being in the interest of the whole community of nations, will require the co-operation and agreement of all States concerned, in conformity with the principle of universality.

73. Accordingly, since this is a question of general interest the solution of which involves varied political, economic, legal and security aspects, the process of drafting a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor must, of course, ensure that

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

due account is taken of the positions and rights of all the parties, in conditions of complete equality. All that represents, moreover, a guarantee of the effectiveness and strength of any international agreement.

74. The detailed debates on all the provisions of the future treaty, the large number of constructive proposals and amendments that have been made by various delegations, and the positive spirit in which the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States have throughout this process submitted new and better versions of the initial document, all contribute to the drafting of a text meeting more and more closely the requirements of such an agreement.

75. As can be seen from a detailed analysis of the text presented on 23 April (CCD/269/Rev.2), efforts will have to be made with even greater perseverance to fill in certain omissions and reformulate certain provisions, in order to satisfy the justified demands expressed in the Committee and thereby to bring about increasing adherence to the document. That is what is expected of the new, revised form of the draft treaty.

76. I should now like to present some comments on behalf of my delegation concerning the basic provisions of the operative part of the draft treaty in its revised form of 23 April.

77. Concerning the nature of the prohibition as set forth in article I, we wish to recall that Romania, along with a large number of other States, has supported the solution prohibiting all military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor by a treaty on total demilitarization. Since at this stage it has not been possible to fulfil that purpose by means of a single instrument, we consider that, as we have already had occasion to emphasize, it is important to spell out in the operative part of the treaty the final aim of the negotiations, namely complete demilitarization, and the obligation on parties to continue in good faith the efforts towards that end. That approach is shared by virtually all the members of the Committee. To incorporate it in the treaty, as has been done in a number of other agreements concluded in recent years, would be tantamount to maintaining the question of demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor within the sphere of negotiations, in the perspective of its total solution.

78. These are the reasons why the Romanian delegation supports the amendment contained in paragraph 3 of the working paper submitted on 30 July by a number of non-aligned countries, which provides for incorporation in the text of the draft treaty of a new article reading as follows:

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"Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith on further measures relating to a more comprehensive prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof". (CCD/297)

For the same motives and with the same end in view we are in favour of the procedural solution, also supported by other delegations, whereby the item dealing with demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor — the item included in the provisional agenda adopted on 15 August 1969 (ENDC/236, p. 3) — would be retained on the agenda of the Committee.

79. Another comment of the Romanian delegation has to do with the special value of the clause in article IV which, as its principal point, makes clear in relevant terms that none of the provisions of that agreement can or should prejudice in any way whatever the rights of States, recognized by international law, over their territorial sea and continental shelf.

80. At the same time it seems to us important that the draft we are discussing should contain in a separate article a clause providing that, five years after the entry into force of the treaty, a conference of the States parties should be convened to examine how its principles and provisions are being implemented, taking into consideration the developments which have taken place as a result of the progress of science and technology.

81. An analysis of article III of the draft, which deals with verification of the obligations assumed under the treaty by the States parties, reveals — apart from certain acceptable elements of the verification system — the persistence of omissions which have given rise to well-founded objections by the representatives of several States. The first objection to the present wording of article III relates to the omission of any reference to the possibility of recourse to appropriate international machinery to verify the obligations that have been assumed and to solve disputes concerning implementation of the treaty. The proposed methods of verification thus seem, as has frequently been emphasized during the negotiations, incomplete and disadvantageous to the smaller States.

82. For its part, the Romanian delegation has from the outset of the negotiations in 1969 expressed itself in favour of the establishment of international control machinery capable of giving all States a fair chance to participate in the verification of obligations (ENDC/PV.424, para. 85). I would recall that at our meeting on 4 September 1969 the Romanian representative stated:

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"We are convinced that the verification system thus conceived would be both effective and impartial by offering all parties the guarantee that the provisions of the treaty would be implemented in accordance with their spirit and their letter. At the same time it would create conditions for effective participation in the exercise of control by small and medium-sized countries which, in view of the technological gap separating them from the major Powers, do not have the necessary means to make sure by themselves that the agreement to which they are parties is respected." (CCD/PV.434, para. 16)

83. For those reasons we express our agreement with the proposal contained in the working paper I have mentioned (CCD/297), submitted by the delegations of Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia on 30 July and advocating the incorporation in article III of the right of States parties to the treaty to undertake verification operations through, in particular, appropriate international procedures within the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

84. Another question which has not yet been properly solved is that of the formulation of the sovereign rights of coastal States over their continental shelves. The statement made by the Romanian representative at the meeting of the Committee on 4 September 1969 declared in regard to this aspect, to which the Romanian delegation attaches particular importance:

"In so far as the control provisions are concerned, we consider that particular attention will have to be given to their effects on the continental shelf. To put it more clearly, account will have to be taken of the need to harmonize the provisions concerning control with the rules governing the continental shelf system. Unlike the territories under the sea located beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, which are not as yet governed by crystallized rules of international law, the marine soil and subsoil within the limits of national jurisdiction come within the scope of clearly defined rules of international law. For example, access to those territories is already the subject of certain regulations, with which the agreement on demilitarization must not clash." (Ibid., para. 17)

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85. Romania, as a party to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf[1/] — which lays down recognized rules for that portion of the marine soil and subsoil which comes under the jurisdiction of the sovereign State — considers that the agreement to be concluded must not contain, in that connexion, new forms of words affecting the free exercise of the sovereign rights of States on the continental shelf as laid down in the Convention, particularly in paragraph 1 of article 2. In spite of the existing controversies, we believe that the question of the rights of sovereign States over the continental shelf — the proper reflection of which in the treaty concerns most coastal countries — must be solved in conformity with their legitimate interests and the rules of international law.

86. Those are the views on the principal provisions of the draft treaty under discussion which the Romanian delegation wished to bring to the attention of the Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 490th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Roberto Caracciolo, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, the United States of America and Romania.

"The delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia submitted a joint memorandum on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare (CCD/310).

"The delegation of the United States of America submitted a working paper on economic data monitoring as a means of verifying compliance with a ban on chemical weapons (CCD/311).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 27 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 499, pp. 311 et seq.